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1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq. (2010); see
also Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding most components
of ACA constitutional).
2. David Horsey, John Roberts Saves “Obamacare,” Enrages Tea Party Conservatives,
LATIMES.COM (June 29, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/29/nation/la-na-tt-john
-roberts-20120628 (referring to “incensed conservatives . . . printing up ‘Impeach John
Roberts’ T-shirts” and “a freshly minted ‘Impeach John Roberts’ Facebook page”).
3. Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBSNEWS.COM
(July 2, 2012 9:43 PM EDT), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-touphold-health-care-law/.
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In late June 2012, Chief Justice Roberts shocked legal and
political analysts alike by voting to uphold the constitutionality
of the Affordable Care Act.1 Conservatives, who generally
opposed the ACA, were so startled by Roberts’s unexpected
decision that some even called for his impeachment.2 Just days
later, fuel was added to the ﬁre when longtime Supreme Court
reporter Jan Crawford broke the news that the Chief Justice had
switched positions in the case. According to Ms. Crawford, who
cited “two knowledgeable sources,” at the conference vote that
followed oral arguments he and the rest of the conservative bloc
were prepared to strike down the constitutionality of the socalled individual mandate.3 However, the Chief Justice
eventually switched his vote and sided with the liberal bloc to
uphold the ACA, albeit on narrow grounds.
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4. How The Court Works—The Justices’ Conference, S. CT. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (n.d.),
https://supremecourthistory.org/htcw_justiceconference.html (explaining that “[i]n a capital
full of classified matters, and full of leaks, the Court keeps private matters private,” and
that although “[r]eporters speculate . . . details of discussion are never disclosed, and the
vote is revealed only when a decision is announced”).
5. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI.
1018, 1024, 1028 (referring to private nature of conference) (1996).
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While we now have some idea of what transpired behind
the scenes in this highly salient case, possessing data of this
nature is the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the rule is
that what happens during the Court’s conference is usually kept
absolutely private, even after a decision is made.4 As a result,
because only the Justices are allowed in the Court’s conference
room for these discussions, they are among the most secretive of
all meetings that take place within the federal government. The
system works so well that the Court has seldom experienced
information leaks about how it will decide or about what
transpires at conference.
Certainly privacy is good for the Justices as it allows them
to candidly express and discuss their positions on some of the
nation’s most important legal and policy issues.5 What is good
for the Court, however, is not always good for those who seek to
understand why the Justices decided in a particular way—and
how they reached their ﬁnal decisions. In fact, scholars and
Court watchers alike would surely have better understood why
the Chief initially joined with his ideological allies to strike the
ACA but then changed his vote if they had been privy to that
initial conference discussion. More generally, such information
would fundamentally alter our understanding of how decisions
develop and how the Justices interpret the law because Court
opinions are the culmination of a process that begins with debate
at conference. As a result, our understanding of where policy
ends is necessarily incomplete without knowing the Justices’
initial legal and policy positions explicated to their colleagues
during conference discussions.
While we do not have access to contemporaneous
conference discussions, we can still learn much about how the
Court develops law, policy, and legal standards from historical
records. Many Justices who retired during the past half-century
left their hand-written notes of what transpired during
conference. These notes provide insights into how the Chief
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Justice, who speaks ﬁrst, frames the legal and policy debate,
how each associate Justice responds to this frame, and how the
discussion about the legal and policy intricacies of a case
proceeds.
Here we provide the first step towards understanding what
transpires during the Court’s private conference discussions.
Using a sample of conference notes transcribed by Professor
Dickson,6 we analyze how Justices interact with one another
during conference and how such interactions affect the degree to
which Justices take part in writing the majority or separate
opinions after conference.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we provide a
broad overview of how conference discussions transpire at the
Court. We then explore the (rather small) literature that has
considered conference from a social-scientific perspective. Next,
we describe and explore the data that we analyze here. We
conclude by describing the broader data we use for our
SCOTUS Notes project, how we will analyze these data, and the
state of our data-collection efforts.
II. BACKGROUND: THE MECHANICS OF SUPREME COURT
CONFERENCE

05/06/2019 10:22:20

6. See DEL DICKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 1940–1985: THE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (Del Dickson ed. 2001).
7. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 109 (11th ed. 2013).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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After hearing oral arguments in each case on the Court’s
plenary docket, the Justices hold conference to discuss the legal
and policy questions of each case and to cast their initial votes.
Discussion within conference begins with the Chief Justice, who
presents his perspective on the facts of the ﬁrst listed case.7
From there he offers his personal view of the case and then casts
his vote.8 When the Chief Justice is done speaking, the associate
Justices offer their views and votes in descending order of
seniority.9
Three features of the Court’s conference make it distinctive
and important for analysis. First, these proceedings are the ﬁrst
time the Justices take direct action on how to decide cases they
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hear.10 This makes analysis of conference particularly signiﬁcant
because, oftentimes, the ﬁrst discussion in a decision process is
the most critical.11 Second, conference votes and stated legal or
policy positions are non-binding. In fact, we know that at least
one Justice changes positions in more than a third of all cases
the Court decides.12 Being able to identify a Justice’s initial
position in a case, therefore, is key to accurately determining
when and why a Justice subsequently joins a coalition or
switches positions later in the process. Third, and most
important for our long-term project, Justices conduct
conferences in private with only the nine Justices allowed in the
room for these discussions.13
Given the norm of privacy about conference discussions,
only the Justices and the law clerks and secretaries they work
with know what transpires during these proceedings. However,
clerks and secretaries are bound by an oath of secrecy that
virtually all take very seriously.14 As a result, the only source of
systematic data about conference is the papers left by retired
Justices. These papers allow us to recreate the nature of the
discussion that sets the stage for the Justices’ ultimate decisions.
Consider Figures 1A and 1B, which together provide an
example to demonstrate the richness of information these
documents contain. The figures reproduce the two pages of
notes taken by Justice Blackmun in the conference for Texas v.
Johnson,15 a case involving freedom of speech and the right to
burn an American flag. These pages reveal that the Justices
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 38 Side B
05/06/2019 10:22:20

10. The Justices hold closely to the norm of not discussing cases prior to conference.
See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON & JUSTIN WEDEKING, ORAL
ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE
DIALOGUE 7–8, 14 (2012) (indicating that the Justices indirectly “discuss” cases through
their questioning during oral argument, but that initial votes and dispositive position taking
do not happen until conference).
11. See generally Kenneth Bettenhausen & J. Keith Murnighan, The Emergence of
Norms in Competitive Decision-Making Groups, 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 350 (1985).
12. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting
Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 587 (1996) (reporting that
“[d]uring the Burger Court, at least one justice changed positions in 36.6% of the cases,
while individual justices switched their votes 7.5% of the time”).
13. E.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 253 (rev’d & updated ed.
2001).
14. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE
MODERN SUPREME COURT vi–vii (2005) (describing commitment to “absolute secrecy”).
15. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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engaged in a great deal of substantive discussion about
protecting an individual’s right versus the state’s interest in
protecting the flag as a symbol of the nation. More generally,
these notes provide evidence of how conference unfolds.

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 39 Side A
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Figure 1A: Justice Blackmun’s Conference Notes, Page 1
Texas v. Johnson (1989)
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Figure 1B: Justice Blackmun’s Conference Notes, Page 2
Texas v. Johnson (1989)
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16. We keep Justice Blackmun’s notes in his shorthand so the reader can know exactly
what he wrote. This notation translates to “thinks the statute is constitutional.” See Figure
1A, supra page 227.
17. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 (indicating that Justice Brennan wrote the Court’s opinion
holding that the First Amendment protected Johnson’s conduct), 421 (indicating that
Justice White joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion).
18. See Figure 1B, supra page 228.
19. Again, Justice Blackmun used his shorthand, but the translation is clear: “Should
not have taken—we lose either way,” and “Not substantially overbroad, because only US
flag would be protected.” See id.
20. “Flag would be unscathed despite opinion—may well be strengthened.” See id.
21. Justice Brennan’s notes on this case corroborate what Justice Blackmun saw
transpire. William J. Brennan Papers, Box I: 813, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress.
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First, Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over, and began, the
deliberations. He called the case for discussion, presented his
views on the issues involved (Justice Blackmun’s notes show
that the Chief Justice believed that the “t stat is const”16), and
ultimately voted to reverse in favor of Texas. From there, the
remaining Justices stated their views and voted in order of
seniority.
Next, Justices Brennan and White spoke and made their
views clear. Justice Blackmun’s notes indicate that Justice
Brennan suggested that flag burning is political speech, that
states may not command respect for the flag, and that the law in
question was too vague. Justice White, on the other hand argued
that the Court would run FA (the First Amendment) into the
ground. Ultimately, Justice Brennan cast a vote for Johnson
while Justice White voted for Texas.17
According to Justice Blackmun’s notes, other Justices had
more to say about the statute and issue they faced in Johnson.
He noted that Justice O’Connor found it to be an “[u]npleasant
case,” but, as she cast a vote for Johnson,18 she suggested that
offensiveness to others is not a standard the Court has ever
approved. Justice Scalia indicated the case “makes me sick”
while Justice Stevens thought the Court “S n hv taken—we lose
either wa” and that the law is “n substantially OB, bec only US
flag wd b protect.”19 Finally, Justice Blackmun noted that
Justice Kennedy would vote for Johnson and, in so doing
thought that the “flag wd b unscathed despite opin—may well be
strengthened.”20
In such a highly salient case as Johnson, it is no wonder the
Justices had much to say about how to decide on the merits.21 Of
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course, the level and intensity of discussion varies from case to
case. In some (from the thousands of cases we have collected), it
appears the Justices have very little to say—the Chief Justice
presents his views and the rest simply note their agreement or
disagreement with that view. In other cases, like Johnson, every
Justice speaks about the legal issues and the ultimate decision
the Court should make. This variation, although clearly
important substantively, has yet to be examined systematically.
Nor have scholars analyzed the downstream implications on the
Court’s decisionmaking process of what transpires during
conference. In general, these proceedings stand out as a
woefully understudied area of scholarship about how Justices on
the nation’s highest Court make decisions.
III. CONFERENCE: EXISTING DATA AND KNOWLEDGE
Systematic scholarly accounts exist of almost every aspect
of the Court’s decisionmaking process—from agenda setting,22
to briefing23 and oral arguments,24 to opinion writing and
bargaining,25 to opinion announcements.26
The one part of the process that has been largely ignored,
however, is its most secretive part: the Justices’ weekly
conference at which they vote on agenda setting by voting to
grant or deny petitions for certiorari and on the merits of cases
that they hear. While studies have focused on conference
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B
05/06/2019 10:22:20

22. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); H.W.
PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE (1991); Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, Selecting the
Select Few: The Discuss List and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 94
SOCIAL SCI. Q. 1124 (2013).
23. See, e.g., Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court Litigants and Strategic Framing, 54 AM.
J. POLITICAL SCI. 617 (2010).
24. See, e.g., BLACK ET AL., supra note 10; Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck &
James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral Arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, 100
AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 99 (2006).
25. See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK,
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000).
26. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan Black & Eve Ringsmuth, Hear Me Roar: What
Provokes Supreme Court Justices to Dissent from the Bench? 93 MINN. L. REV. 1560
(2009).

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 41 Side A

05/06/2019 10:22:20

BLACKJOHNSONRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE NOTES

5/1/2019 11:16 AM

231

05/06/2019 10:22:20

27. See, e.g., Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 12, at 581; Jan Palmer & Saul
Brenner, The Law Clerks’ Recommendations and the Conference Vote On-the-Merits on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 185 (1995).
28. E.g., Knight & Epstein, supra note 5.
29. See generally, e.g., Saul Brenner & Jan Palmer, The Law Clerks’ Recommendations
and Chief Justice Vinson’s Vote on Certiorari, 18 AM. POLITICS Q. 68 (1990); Palmer &
Brenner, supra note 27; Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief?
Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 421 (1996) (using
conference votes in analysis of factors affecting Chief Justice’s opinion-writing
assignments).
30. E.g., THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS, II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1 (2006) (recognizing that “Supreme Court decisions do not
just resolve immediate, narrow disputes; they also set broader precedent”).

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 41 Side A

votes,27 or on discussion in small samples of cases,28 to date
there has not been a full-scale systematic account of what
transpires during these proceedings.
A key reason why conference has not yet received the same
attention as other parts of the Court’s decisionmaking process is
that only the Justices take part in these meetings. Nobody else is
allowed in the conference room when they discuss cases—no
security, no secretaries, and no clerks. This means, at least for
the contemporary Court, that we know little about how the
wheels of justice work at this stage of the process.
Analyses of conference that do exist conventionally limit
their analyses of Supreme Court conference to the Justices’
dispositional votes to affirm or reverse a lower court decision.29
This focus is largely predicated on practical concerns. That is,
votes are predominantly dichotomous (i.e., affirm or reverse)
and are clearly recorded on “docket sheets,” which are a singlepage voting records maintained by each Justice for every case
the Court decides. Despite these advantages, focusing on votes
has a critical drawback—they provide no information or context
about why a Justice arrived at a given vote. This is a signiﬁcant
limitation because in the U.S., as in any common law system,
the main contribution of any decision by the Court is typically
not who won or lost but rather the legal rule contained within the
written opinion.30 Moreover, there are often numerous legal
justiﬁcations available for each possible disposition. In turn,
Justices can and, as evidenced by the rise in concurring
opinions, often do disagree about how the Court should go about
reaching an agreed-upon dispositional outcome.
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31. 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
32. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (Breyer, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Consider, for example, the 2015 decision in Zivotofsky ex
rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,31 in which the Court, by a vote of six to
three, struck down part of a federal law and held that only the
President (and not Congress) has the ability to recognize foreign
states. In this case Justices Breyer and Thomas ﬁled opinions
that, although supporting the outcome of the majority, took issue
with its legal justiﬁcation. Justice Breyer believed the case to be
inappropriate for the Court to adjudicate due to the politicalquestion doctrine.32 Justice Thomas, by contrast, agreed with the
declaration of unconstitutionality but opposed Justice Kennedy’s
assertion in the Court’s opinion that Congress has no power over
naturalization laws.33
Much as in the 2012 ACA case, it will be some time before
the private records of what transpired during the Court’s
conference discussion in Zivotofsky are made public. But, we
can conjecture that docket sheets in this case would simply
indicate Justice Breyer as voting to affirm. That is, his vote
would be, in the parlance of variable measurement, “pooled”
with those of the other four Justices who voted, with no
additional reservations, to affirm. This case illustrates
poignantly the important gap that can exist between Justices’
dichotomous votes and their actual scope of preferences over
legal policy.
Conference notes, which record both votes and the
justiﬁcation for those votes, offer the only way to ﬁll this gap
and to recover the fullness of each Justice’s preliminary
preferences in a case. In other words, conference notes can
uniquely answer the important question of “why?” Despite this
promise, practical considerations have prevented scholars from
embracing the usefulness of conference notes. Both data
collection and coding are resource intensive—especially in the
type of empirical studies conducted by many scholars. Because
of this barrier, even scholars who study aspects of the Court’s
decisionmaking process that take place after conference have

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 42 Side A

05/06/2019 10:22:20

BLACKJOHNSONRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE NOTES

5/1/2019 11:16 AM

233

been forced to ignore the substance of what takes place in
conference.34
To make our contention about the importance of conference
notes clear, we turn to controversial and highly inﬂuential
research showing that a majority of Justices, in a majority of
cases, do not adhere to the norm of stare decisis,35 and to equally
inﬂuential research that mined Justice Brennan’s conference
notes to rebut those claims.36 We believe that the latter analysis,
although limited to nine cases, shows that what transpired during
the Court’s conference in those cases provides compelling
evidence that the Justices believe precedent matters. Indeed,
Justice Brennan’s notes indicate that fully eighty-three percent
of the comments made by the Justices during conference
mention precedent. As Professors Knight and Epstein conclude,
“[t]he very fact that precedent would be employed as a source of
persuasion in their private communications suggests that the
Justices believe that it can have an effect on the choices of their
colleagues.”37 This conclusion strongly supports our general
claim that Justices use conference to discuss issues that warrant
serious attention and that are potentially dispositive in particular
cases. It also highlights just how much scholars can learn about
the Court by peering into the notes of a single Justice in a
handful of cases.
Another study conducted after the influential work of
Professors Knight and Epstein using conference notes examined
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 42 Side A
05/06/2019 10:22:20

34. See, e.g., David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic, Choice and Majority Opinion
Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POLITICAL SCI. 652 (1972); see
also MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 25; Clifford Carrubba, Barry Friedman, Andrew D.
Martin & Georg Vanberg , Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions? 56 AM.
J. POLITICAL SCI. 400 (2012); Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and
Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 276
(2007); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57 POLITICAL RESEARCH Q. 551 (2004); Maltzman &
Wahlbeck, supra note 29; Saul Brenner, Strategic Choice and Opinion Assignment on the
U. S. Supreme Court: A Reexamination, 35 W. POLITICAL Q. 204 (1982).
35. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (interpreting study results as strong support for the attitudinal
model of Supreme Court decisionmaking, which treats Justices’ decisions as driven only by
their personal ideological preferences). Professors Knight and Epstein conducted the
research in Justice Brennan’s notes. See generally Knight & Epstein, supra note 5.
36. The Google Scholar citation counts for the Segal and Spaeth and the Knight and
Epstein articles were, as of March 29, 2019, 311 and 294, respectively.
37. Knight & Epstein, supra note 5, at 1024–26 (emphasis omitted).
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how oral arguments inﬂuence the Court’s decisionmaking
process. Professor Johnson determined in it that issues raised
during oral argument were subsequently discussed by the
Justices during conference.38 The key to both of these studies is
that they were among the initial salvos in lines of research that
resulted in overturning established conventional wisdom
regarding law as a constraint on the Justices and the importance
of oral argument in the Court’s decisionmaking process.39
Despite the lacuna of analyses about the Court’s conference
discussions, we can still learn much about how the Court
develops law, policy, and legal standards from historical
records. Indeed, as we note in the introduction, many Justices
who retired over the past half-century left hand-written notes of
what they saw and heard transpire during conferences in which
they were participants. These notes provide insights into how the
Chief Justice, who speaks first, frames the legal and policy
debate, how each associate Justice responds to this frame, and
how the discussion about the legal and policy intricacies of a
case proceeds. Here we turn to a first cut of these data to provide
readers with a glimpse of conference discussions at the Court. In
particular, we are interested in exploring the degree to which
Justices interact with one another.
IV. A FIRST CUT: ANALYZING THE DICKSON DATA

05/06/2019 10:22:20

38. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2004) (reporting on research involving examination of
conference notes of Justices Powell, Brennan, and Douglas, and oral-argument notes of
Justice Powell, in seventy-five civil-liberties cases).
39. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998);
JOHNSON, supra note 38.
40. DICKSON, supra note 6. Dickson’s volume is one of the most under-appreciated
resources in the area of law and courts. Indeed, he provided an unprecedented glimpse into
an environment that was before his work almost impossible for scholars to access.
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In an incredible solo effort, Professor Dickson gathered,
transcribed, and provided editorial content for conference notes
from the papers of eight Justices in just under 300 cases decided
between 1940 and 1985.40 We used those data for a multi-angle
assessment of the Justices’ conference behavior by treating the
Dickson data as primary source material, digitizing the pages
that provided his transcription of the notes and restricting our
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analysis to the 257 cases decided from the 1946 term onward.41
We then did some basic processing with the Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count program to count the total number of words
spoken and other related quantities.42
We begin with how often Justices speak—in the aggregate
as well as individually. The conventional wisdom is that each
Justice speaks only once and then votes at the end of his or her
comments. Figure 2 allows us to assess this wisdom, indicating
that, while in the vast majority of cases each Justice speaks only
one time (or perhaps not at all), there are cases in which
discussion is much longer. Sometimes Justices engage in a
prolonged back and forth. At the extreme are several cases in
which the total of speaking turns was more than twenty-five.
Multiple Justices clearly spoke multiple times during the
discussion—a break in the norm that generally controls
conference. We explore some of these outlier cases below.

Certainly it is telling that there are cases—presumably
highly salient ones—in which Justices speak more than once.
Indeed, this goes against the admonition of former Chief Justice

05/06/2019 10:22:20

41. We chose this term because it marks the beginning of the Vinson Court and is the
first term included in the Modern version of the Supreme Court Database, which is our
source for data on case attributes. See Supreme Court Database—2018 Release 1, WASH. UNIV.
SCH. OF L., http://scdb.wustl.edu (providing dozens of useful case- and Justice-level variables).
42. We used the 2015 Mac implementation of the program [hereinafter LIWC], which
was available in December 2018 at http://liwc.wpengine.com.
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Figure 2: Total Speaking Turns for Justices at Conference, 1946–1985
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Rehnquist, who suggested that conference discussions are hardly
conversations because there is not enough time during them to
discuss the nuances of every case.43 What we find, however, is
variation in the extent to which Chief Justices allow discussions
to go beyond each Justice’s first comments. Specifically,
consider the data in Figure 3, which depicts the proportion of
cases over three Chief-Justice eras in which there were more
than nine speaking turns during conference discussions about a
given case.

Figure 3: Proportion of Cases with Nine or More Speaking Turns
at Conference, 1946–1985

05/06/2019 10:22:20

43. See REHNQUIST, supra note 13, at 255 (explaining that each Justice “has done such
work as he deems necessary to arrive at his own views before coming into conference,”
and that conference is “not a bull session in which off-the-cuff reactions are traded, but
instead a discussion in which considered views are stated”).
44. Indeed, one scholar has stated of Chief Justice Burger that “[h]e imposed little
discipline but allowed each Justice to interrupt others and speak as long as he or she
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This figure makes clear that there was much more
discussion on the Warren Court than there was on the Vinson
Court. In fact, over half of all cases from the Warren Court
involved at least one Justice speaking multiple times during
conference. These freewheeling conferences were cut in half by
Chief Justice Burger when he took over the Court in 1969,
which is contrary to conventional views of how he ran
conference.44 Despite the unconventional view, it is clear that
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each Chief Justice covered in these data allowed some
discussion, in some cases, beyond one comment per Justice.
Understanding aggregate Court behavior is important as we
draw a sketch of how Justices interact during conference.
However, to have a clearer picture of the discussions it is
equally (and perhaps more) important to understand the behavior
of individual Justices during these proceedings. We turn in
consequence to an assessment of how individual Justices act as
they speak about individual cases. Figure 4 provides data on the
numbers of words uttered by Justices (according to the notes
taken by their colleagues) in the Dickson sample of cases.

Figure 4: Individual Words Spoken during Conference, 1946–1985

05/06/2019 10:22:20

wished,” and that “[a]s a consequence, senior Justices often spoke multiple times before
junior Justices were able to make their initial contribution, and often little was left to be
said by the time the end of the queue was reached.” Joel K. Goldstein, Leading the Court:
Studies in Influence as Chief Justice, 40 STETSON L. REV. 717, 736 (2011) (footnotes
omitted).
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Most Justices are not overly loquacious during conference.
Indeed, the median utterance length is just thirty-six words,
which is roughly equivalent to a couple of sentences. At sixtytwo words, the mean word count is quite a bit higher, which is
why we see such a pronounced skew in the figure above.
Although the eye cannot help but be drawn to some of the
extreme values on the horizontal axis, these are truly outlier
values. Ninety percent of the data fall between the values of two
and 199 words (i.e., the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles,
respectively). Thus, although the number of speaking turns
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suggests more back and forth than the literature would suggest,
the speaker-level data show that these exchanges are quite brief.
In general, Justices make their views known and cast their
votes—with little fanfare and without extravagant justification.
Consider Figure 1A, the first page of Justice Blackmun’s notes
in Texas v. Johnson, which are representative of the findings
shown in Figure 3. While the Chief Justice laid out the facts and
his views, the other Justices did not add much before casting
their votes. Certainly there is variation, and sometimes Justices
used hundreds of words, but that is the exception, not the rule.
In some ways, this should not be especially surprising: the
Justices have all read the same briefs and heard the same oral
argument. Thus, by the time they sit as a collegial body to
discuss the case, everyone is equipped with a common language.
Furthermore, to the extent Justices are stable in their
preferences, the surprises that might require discussion are
probably few. Justice Scalia, for instance, was unlikely to
reiterate at each conference why he was taking an originalist
position in a case involving constitutional issues.
While the preceding figures and discussion bring us closer
to understanding participation by each Justice in conference, we
are not yet at an individual level. We turn to that level by
providing data on median word count by Justice and by seniority
during our time period. Consider the former first in Figure 5.
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 44 Side B
05/06/2019 10:22:20

Figure 5: Median Word Count at Conference by Justice, 1946–1985
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As with the previous figures, there is clear variation
between the Justices’ penchants for speaking during conference.
Measured in this way, Justice Frankfurter is the most talkative of
the Justices. This is in keeping with his reputation as the
intellectual of the Court during his tenure.45 Next come the
several Chief Justices, which is intuitive given that Chief
Justices speak first, lay out the facts of the cases (as they see
them), and then present their views of the issues.
At that point there is little indication that senior associate
Justices speak more often than their junior colleagues. Indeed,
Justices Stevens and Powell are near the top of the list, but
neither is near the most senior during our analysis. Yet Justices
Stewart and Brennan are near the top third, which is intuitive as
both were near the most senior (and Justice Brennan became the
most senior after Justice Douglas left the bench in 1975).
To illustrate the way in which tenure affects the amount
each Justice speaks during conference, Figure 6 shows the
Justices by seat. Seat 1 is the Chief Justice, while seat nine is the
most junior Justice to join the Court.

05/06/2019 10:22:20

45. See, e.g., JAMES W. VICE, THE REOPENING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: ON
SKEPTICISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 148–49 (1998) (reporting that “it was widely
assumed that Frankfurter, with his brilliance and scholarship, would greatly influence and
dominate the Court,” but noting as well that “the Court is not easily dominated,” that
“Frankfurter remained too professorial toward his peers” and that he “was quite candid
about his trait of lecturing his colleagues,” referring in his diaries to “speaking in
conference ‘rather at length,’ . . . speaking ‘at some length,’ . . . speaking ‘at length,’ . . .
and speaking ‘somewhat at length’” (internal citations omitted)).

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 45 Side A

Figure 6: Median Word Count by Speaking Order at Conference, 1946–1985
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46. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (addressing extent of executive power).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (addressing legally sanctioned racial segregation in schools).
48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (same).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (addressing abortion).
50. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (addressing racial integration of state-funded law school).
51. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (addressing state statutes apportioning state legislative
districts).
52. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (addressing limits on political contributions under Federal
Election Campaign Act).
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What is immediately evident is that the first two speakers—
the Chief Justice and the senior associate Justice—speak the
most words at conference. This, as we indicate above, is
intuitive. That is, the chief sets out the facts of each case and
also presents his views and votes. When the most senior Justice
is ideologically distinct from the chief (for example, Justice
Douglas and Chief Justice Burger, Justice Brennan and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg and Chief Justice Roberts)
the senior associate Justice probably lays out the opposite view
of the case in a strong manner. From there, it is evident that the
remaining associate Justices speak much less than the first two
speakers. The fourth Justice to speak, for instance, says roughly
one-third of what either the Chief Justice or the senior associate
Justice will say. Interestingly, however, the downward trend is
not constant over the last half of the Justices. In fact, we see that
the fifth and sixth Justices to speak are doing so at a level
consistent with the third Justice. And, perhaps most interesting
of all, the second-to-last Justice ends up being the third most
verbose in terms of median words spoken. In short, although
there is clear seniority effect at the very beginning of a case’s
discussion, we see no clear evidence of a generalized pattern
among the seven Justices who speak after the first two.
Finally, we turn back from a Justice view of conference to
the case level to give a final view of conference. Consider, first,
Table 1, which explicates the top twenty cases in terms of total
words spoken by the Justices. The vast majority of these cases
are among the most salient (politically and legally) from the
twentieth century: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 46
and Brown v. Board of Education47 both make the list, as do
Brown II,48 Roe v. Wade,49 Sweatt v. Painter,50 Baker v. Carr,51
and Buckley v. Valeo.52
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Table 1
Top-Twenty Cases: Total Word Count, 1946–198553
Words

Case Name

Term

Brown v. Bd. of Educ.

1953

5311

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

1951

2857

Scales v. U.S.

1960

2822

Garner v. La.

1961

2668

Yates v. U.S.

1956

2654

Brown II

1954

2444

Ariz. v. Cal.

1962

2443

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.

1955

2329

Sweatt v. Painter

1949

2310

Baker v. Carr

1961

2293

Bell v. Md.

1963

2263

Roe v. Wade

1972

2084

Buckley v. Valeo

1975

1619

Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan

1981

1559

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

1981

1537

Cox v. La.

1964

1468

Bowsher v. Synar

1985

1432

Maxwell v. Bishop

1969

1425

Davis v. Bandemer

1985

1374

Williams v. Ga.

1954

A similar list emerges in Table 2, where we have the top
twenty speaking turns by individual Justices during conference.
However, while many of the same cases appear, the pattern here
is that, in highly salient cases, several Justices dominate the
discussion. Justice Brennan appears quite often, as does Justice
Black. Potentially noteworthy is who does not tend to appear on
the lists—the Chief Justices. As we saw earlier, a Chief Justice
tends to speak more in a typical case than do the other Justices.

05/06/2019 10:22:20

53. Full case citations are listed alphabetically in the Appendix. See infra page 259.
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Yet only four of the top-twenty spots are occupied by Chief
Justices, with Chief Justices Vinson and Warren both appearing
twice. Chief Justice Burger never once cracks the top twenty.
Indeed, one would need to go all the way down to the fiftyfourth spot in our ranking to find him. (He earned that rank by
speaking 352 words in Buckley v. Valeo.)
Table 2
Top-Twenty Conferences—Individual Word Count, 1946–198554
Justice

Case Name

Term

1117

Vinson

Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer

1951

1086

Brennan

Bowsher v. Synar

1985

1084

Brennan

Davis v. Bandemer

1985

1067

Brennan

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

1981

1051

Frankfurter

Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer

1951

1041

Minton

Brown v. Bd.

1953

947

Brennan

Grove City College v. Bell

1983

936

Brennan

Firefighters Local v. Stotts

1983

814

Warren

Bell v. Md.

1963

812

Black

Ariz. v. Cal.

1962

767

Black

Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer

1951

730

Brennan

Ore. v. Elstad

1984

682

Warren

Yates v. U.S.

1956

675

Black

Sweatt v. Painter

1949

675

Frankfurter

Brown v. Bd.

1953

635

Vinson

Brown v. Bd.

1953

619

Black

Brown II

1954

610

Goldberg

Bell v. Md.

1963

599

Brennan

Boston Firefighters Union Local 718 v. NAACP

1982

581

Brennan

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp

1983

Overall, even these basic descriptive summaries show a
good deal of variation in the amount of discussion that takes
place at conference and which Justices do the most speaking.

05/06/2019 10:22:20

54. Full case citations are listed alphabetically in the Appendix. See infra page 259.

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 46 Side B

Words

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 47 Side A

05/06/2019 10:22:20

BLACKJOHNSONRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

5/1/2019 11:16 AM

SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE NOTES

243

These are the first data, so far as we know, to paint a picture of
what happens in these most secretive meetings. But to what end?
We know that the key to the entire decisionmaking process is
the legal and policy output produced in the Court’s opinions.55
In the next section we begin an accounting of how what happens
during the conference influences the latter stages of that process.
V. THE IMPACT OF CONFERENCE:
LEVEL OF DISCUSSION AND OPINION WRITING
We examine here the degree to which conference affects the
Court’s opinion-writing process by merging our word-count data
with the Supreme Court Database.56 We turn first to assignment of
the majority opinion. Figure 7 shows the results of examining
whether a Justice who voted with the majority wrote the majority
opinion. The x-axis shows the words spoken by a majority-coalition
member during conference.57 The y-axis shows the probability that a
Justice in the majority coalition wrote the Court’s opinion.

05/06/2019 10:22:20

55. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 4; LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME
COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992); Tracey E.
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM.
POLITICAL SCI. REV. 323 (1992).
56. See note 41, supra.
57. For the x-axis, we transformed the raw measure into the natural logarithm (which
for the values 10, 100, and 1000 is 2.3, 4.6, and 6.9, respectively) to account for the skewed
nature of the underlying data and reduce the impact of large values. The extreme variation
in raw word-count data is shown in Figure 4 on page 237.
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Figure 7: The Probability of Writing the Majority Based on
How Much a Justice Speaks at Conference, 1946–1985
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As Figure 7 makes clear, there is a positive relationship
between how often a Justice speaks and the probability that she
writes the majority. Justices who speak the most (logged) words
have almost a thirty-percent chance of writing, while those who
speak the least have less than a ten-percent chance. This is a
significant difference, especially given the Chief Justices’ norm
of opinion-writing equity.58 Such a norm should indicate that
each Justice writes about eleven percent of all majorities. But
being more active at conference can alter this probability, which
may affect the policy and law that the Court sets.
Of course, a Justice who speaks more often is also more
likely to write a dissent in that case. Figure 8 drives home this
point. Just as before, the x-axis shows the level of a Justice’s
activity at conference. The y-axis now shows the probability that
a Justice, conditional on casting a dissenting vote, ends up also
writing a dissenting opinion (as opposed to just signing one).
Here, too, we find a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the two variables. Being active in the initial
discussion about a case makes Justices more likely to push back
against a majority with which they disagree. In fact, Justices
who speak the most have roughly a seventy-five percent chance
of writing a dissent. In contrast, those who speak the least have
just a fifty-five percent chance of writing a dissent.

05/06/2019 10:22:20

58. E.g., MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 25, at 30–31 (describing
change by Chief Justice Rehnquist from distributing opinion assignments equally by
number to distributing opinion assignments equally by workload, which can take note of
“the difficulty of the opinion assigned or the amount of work the ‘assignee’ may have”).
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Figure 8: Probability of Writing a Dissent Based on
How Much a Justice Speaks at Conference, 1946–1985
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Finally, we expect that when there is more total discussion
among the entire Court at conference more total separate
opinions will be authored by the Justices. That is, the individuallevel phenomenon we identify above will carry over into the
aggregate. Figure 9 shows the results of this analysis. The x-axis
plots the total number of words spoken at conference and the yaxis shows the overall number of separate opinions filed in a case.

Figure 9: Number of Separate Opinions Based on How Much a
Justice Speaks at Conference, 1946–1985

VI. NEXT STEPS: PROJECT SCOTUS NOTES
A. The Dickson Data and Their Limitations

05/06/2019 10:22:20

The foregoing demonstrates the value of providing a
systematic study of Supreme Court conference. We were only
able to do so because of the tremendous and painstaking efforts
on the part of Professor Dickson. His data provide the only point
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Consistent with the findings in the previous figures, this is
indeed the case as well. When the most logged words are spoken
at conference, we expect to see, on average, just over two and a
half separate opinions written in a case. However, as Justices say
less, the number of opinions drops to just over one per case. This
may have something to do with the level of controversy in a
case, or the fact that the Justices speak much less when they
agree more—both at conference and as they decide whether to
write separately.
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of entry for those who want to systematically examine Supreme
Court conference discussions. It is clear that Justices have
important discussions during these proceedings and that ample
variation exists, both in terms of how much Justices say and the
various factors that explain this variation. Why, then, has it
taken nearly two decades for someone to shed even the faintest
glimmer of light on such a significant data source?
Arriving at a definitive answer is, of course, impossible, but
we have some hunches. In particular, we believe that two
aspects of the Dickson data have limited their usefulness to
empirical studies.
1. Narrow in Scope

05/06/2019 10:22:20

59. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 88–89 (6th ed.
2015) (tabulating relevant data in Table 2-8: “Signed Opinions, Cases Disposed of by
Signed Opinion, and Cases Disposed of by Per Curiam Opinion, 1926–2013 Terms”).
60. This was still a tremendous amount of effort on Professor Dickson’s part, however,
in terms of time required—a fact we appreciate more and more with each day we work on
our own ongoing project.
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Consider, first, the scope of cases included. During the
terms Dickson covers (1940 through 1985), the Supreme Court
released just under 6100 opinions (either signed or per curiam)
in its orally argued cases.59 All told, however, fewer than five
percent were transcribed and included in his volume.60 The
Dickson data are a sample. Of course there is nothing inherently
wrong with samples and they often make feasible otherwise
impossible analyses. However, the sample must be
representative of the underlying population about which we wish
to learn. This leads to the second and more significant limitation
of the Dickson data—the several ways in which the sample of
transcribed cases is unrepresentative. Here we highlight three
factors on which meaningful differences exist: subject matter,
case divisiveness, and media salience.
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2. Unrepresentative of the Whole
a. Case Subject Matter
During the 1946 to 1985 terms (the Vinson, Warren, and
Burger Courts) the Court issued 5777 opinions that appear in the
Supreme Court Database with an identified substantive issue
area.61 During these terms, at the population level, fifty-two
percent of cases involved civil liberties (First Amendment rights
and privacy, for example),62 twenty-five percent dealt with
economic activity or unions; and fourteen percent were about
questions of judicial power (issues of comity or justiciability, for
example).63 As for what cases ended up appearing in the
Dickson transcription, however, there are significant differences.
Civil liberties cases account for an overwhelming eighty-six
percent of the Dickson data sample, whereas economics and
judicial-power cases combined represent only ten percent. More
generally, we can say that a systematic relationship exists
between a case’s substantive issue area and whether it was
selected for inclusion by Professor Dickson.
b. Case Divisiveness

05/06/2019 10:22:20

61. Supreme Court Database, supra note 41.
62. We follow existing work and coarsen issue area as follows: civil liberties cases
involve criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and
attorney-representation issues. Economics cases involve unions or economic activity.
These mappings come from Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience,
AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 66, 70–74 (2000).
63. The other remaining nine percent of cases were in the areas of federalism (five
percent), taxation (four percent), and miscellaneous (less than one percent).
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Across the same 5777 decisions, the Court’s vote was
minimum-winning (a five-to-four vote) about fourteen percent
of the time. However, twenty-eight percent of the cases in the
Dickson data sample—twice the relative frequency in the
population—were decided by a one-vote margin. Cases with a
high degree of consensus, which is to say those with majorities
of eight or nine, are particularly underrepresented in Professor
Dickson’s sample. Accounting for forty-three percent of the
5777-case population, they are the modal outcome for the Court.
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However, they represent just twenty-two percent of cases
included in the Dickson data.
c. Case Media Salience
Between 1946 and 1985, the New York Times provided
front-page coverage (the conventional measure of case
salience)64 for thirteen percent of the Court’s decisions. Yet
sixty-two percent of the cases included in Professor Dickson’s
sample received front-page treatment by the Times.
B. The Dickson Data Behind SCOTUS Notes

05/06/2019 10:22:20

64. See Epstein & Segal, supra note 62, at 72–81.
65. We can appreciate that choice because our own teaching in constitutional law tends
to focus on civil liberties cases, especially those that are controversial (such as cases that
are decided by close final merits votes) and highly salient at the time they were decided.
And, in that regard, the Dickson volume is an absolute—if tragically underutilized—gem
of a resource. Professor Dickson provides an unprecedented glimpse into an environment
that was previously inaccessible to scholars. His volume is full of rich anecdotes that we
both routinely use in our courses. Most important, he demonstrates that much can be
learned from a careful and considered analysis of the Justices’ conference notes.
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To be clear, Professor Dickson was no fool in selecting
cases to transcribe. The point of his volume was to uncover what
had been said in cases that would be of potential interest to
Supreme Court scholars and professors of constitutional law.
Each of the areas we identify above as being “unrepresentative,”
then, is likely the product of an intentional choice, one with
which we have no quarrel.65 Yet, to the extent we are interested
in a generalizable accounting of what goes on during
conference, the corpus of cases in the Dickson data is limited in
its ability to present such a picture.
And, as for how the process of “normal science” is
supposed to work, we seek to build on Professor Dickson’s work
and on our preliminary efforts laid out above. To that end, we
are in the late middle stages of a significant project that
ultimately seeks to fill the critical void left by Professor Dickson
and provide generalizable data on Supreme Court conference. In
March 2016 we commenced our work on “Project SCOTUS
Notes.” With generous financial support from the National
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66. See generally ZOONIVERSE.ORG, https://www.zooniverse.org/about (describing
function of what it characterizes as “the world’s largest and most popular platform for
people-powered research”). We provide a full description of our use of Zooniverse below.
See text accompanying notes 73–80, infra.
67. Supreme Court Database, supra note 41.
68. Since Justice Blackmun’s retirement in 1994, only five other Justices have left the
Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist died in 2005, Justice O’Connor retired in 2006, Justice
Souter retired in 2009, Justice Stevens retired in 2010, and Justice Kennedy retired in 2018.
Our review of the access restrictions on their papers suggests that Blackmun’s will be the
most current for some time to come.
69. No graduate students were unduly harmed in the collection of these data, so far as
we know. Lest you think we kept all the glory for ourselves, it is worth noting that we both
spent similar summers as graduate students gathering archival data for our own advisor’s
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Science Foundation, and significant in-kind assistance from
Zooniverse,66 we will distribute a freely accessible and fully
transcribed database of thousands of pages of conferences notes
that span nearly half a century of Supreme Court
decisionmaking.
Our work has involved (and continues to involve) a number
of steps. To make our project tractable, we started by gathering
all available conference notes from the archives of Justices who
served on the Supreme Court between its 1946 and 1993 terms.
We choose 1946 as the starting term as it is the ﬁrst term for
which systematic case-level data are available through the
Supreme Court Database.67 The 1946 term also corresponds to
the beginning of Fred M. Vinson’s tenure as Chief Justice. This
is signiﬁcant because the Vinson Court bridges the gap between
the economic-heavy jurisprudence that characterized the Stone
Court (1941 through 1946) and the civil-liberties-focused
caseload of the Warren Court (1953 through 1969). We select
1993 as our ﬁnal term because it corresponds to the last term for
which archival data are currently available (in the papers of
Justice Blackmun).68 Across these forty-eight terms the Supreme
Court issued a total of nearly 6900 decisions, decrees, or
judgments that contained a total of almost forty million words.
Our project’s goal is to provide scholars with the data necessary
to better understand how these words originated.
To accomplish this herculean task, we started by
dispatching a number of research assistants to the Library of
Congress Manuscript Reading Room in Washington, where they
took tens of thousands of digital photographs of the conference
notes contained in archives of several Justices.69 Although the
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work is not physically laborious (like landscaping work), it is
drudgery at its finest: sitting in a windowless room under the
glow of fluorescent lights, eight hours a day, six days a week.70
Digital photographs in hand, our next step was to process, edit,
and otherwise prepare these images for transcription. Combined,
these first two steps took roughly a year and a half to
accomplish.
The third step in our process—and where we, as of spring
2019 currently stand—is to convert digital images of conference
notes to readable transcriptions. As the examples shown above
in Figures 1A and 1B suggest, all of the conference notes
contained in our data were written by hand. The Supreme Court,
as an institution, has a penchant for being remarkably slow to
embrace technological change.71 And, although there is
relatively recent evidence of the Justices’ willingness to
individually embrace technology in their day-to-day
workflows,72 we know of no existing evidence that laptop or
tablet computers have (yet) made their way into the hallowed
conference room. Thankfully, we are not the first researchers to
encounter copious quantities of scrawled writings by
septuagenarians.
Bridging the gap between raw image and digital text is
therefore a daunting task that requires countless hours of human
eyes and human hands to decipher and transcribe the
handwriting. To make this feasible we partnered with
Zooniverse, an NSF-supported online citizen-science
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 50 Side B
05/06/2019 10:22:20

NSF-sponsored research projects. We prefer to think of it as a rite of passage for judicialpolitics students.
70. The idealized vision you have in your head of the Library of Congress from the
National Treasure movies? That Manuscript Reading Room—the one of breathtaking
beauty—is across the street in the Thomas Jefferson building. Whatever is left of your soul
when you work in Supreme Court records as a graduate student is in the James Madison
building, where the more prosaic manuscript reading rooms reside.
71. See generally, e.g., Jerry Goldman, The U.S. Supreme Court and Information
Technology: From Opacity to Transparency in Three Easy Steps, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
325 (2013).
72. In a 2010 interview with C-SPAN, Justice Kagan remarked that she used a Kindle
e-reader to review briefs. She similarly stated that Justice Scalia read briefs on an iPad. Jan
Crawford, Kagan’s Kindle vs. Scalia’s iPad, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13, 2010), https://www.cbs
news.com/news/kagans-kindle-vs-scalias-ipad/.
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organization founded in 2007.73 Our SCOTUS Notes project is
the first social science or law-related project represented on the
platform, but data transcription has been part of the Zooniverse
project portfolio since 2011, when it engaged approximately
8000 volunteers to transcribe Greek papyri fragments one
character at a time using an online keyboard.74 We chose the
Zooniverse platform because it has demonstrated repeatedly that
it can be harnessed with unprecedented success to overcome the
previously insurmountable practical barriers to working with
large amounts of unprocessed analog documents.75
We worked with Zooniverse to create SCOTUS Notes, an
interactive website that enables volunteers to transcribe and
decode the conference notes data we gathered.76 This platform
was based on an already-existing transcription model that
Zooniverse developed for Tate Britain, in which multiple users
transcribe a line of text and their responses are automatically
compared using a string-matrix algorithm to determine
consensus.77 This algorithm minimizes the degree of editorial
intervention, a bottleneck that has been identified as a major
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73. Project development at Zooniverse (CDI-II 0941610) is overseen by a collaborative
effort among the University of Minnesota, Oxford University, and Chicago’s Adler
Planetarium. Zooniverse is the largest academic crowdsourcing organization in operation,
with over 400 academic, museum, and library partners around the world. Currently, more
than 1.3 million registered volunteers participate in over thirty projects ranging from the
sciences to the humanities.
74. See www.ancientlives.org.
75. In January 2014, Zooniverse partnered with the United Kingdom’s National
Archives and the Imperial War Museum in London to transcribe British unit war diaries
from World War I. Approximately 11,000 volunteers have processed over 100,000 pages
of text, providing the equivalent of more than six years of full-time effort on the project in
only eighteen months. See generally OPERATION WAR DIARY (n.d.), https://www.operation
wardiary.org/). Most recently, in early March 2015, Zooniverse launched a transcription
project called “Science Gossip” that, just four months later, had through the work of over
4500 volunteers made roughly 230,000 total classifications. See generally SCIENCEGOSSIP
(n.d.), https://www.operationwardiary.org/.
76. SCOTUSNOTES: BEHIND THE SCENES AT SUPREME COURT CONFERENCE (n.d.),
https://www.zooniverse.org/projects/zooniverse/scotus-notes-behind-the-scenes-at-supreme
-court-conference.
77. For each transcribed line, the algorithm compares users’ transcriptions and when a
predetermined subset of users has produced the same transcription, the system will log this
consensus as well as each user’s individual transcription. There will, of course, be
instances when consensus does not emerge. When this occurs, human editors, including us,
our graduate students, and expert volunteers, will arbitrate between various users’
transcriptions and produce a final version.
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78. Three specific Zooniverse projects (Ancient Lives, Galaxy Zoo, and Snapshot
Serengeti) demonstrate that results from identifications made through this consensus
algorithm of lay people (including children) are highly accurate. Previous scholarly
research in political science has also suggested that it is an appropriate methodology for
classifying data like the Justices’ conference notes. See Kenneth Benoit, Drew Conway,
Benjamin E. Lauderdale, Michel Laver, & Slava Mikhaylov, Crowd-Sourced Text
Analysis: Reproducible and Agile Production of Political Data, 110 AM. POLITICAL SCI.
REV. 278 (2016).
79. As of this writing, the transcription is only about ten percent complete. Beginning in
early 2019, we will set volunteers to transcribing another 29,800 images. We are confident
that we can have this done within a year’s time.
80. See note 41, supra.
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stumbling block to producing good data efficiently in other
transcription projects.78
The success of these efforts, of course, ultimately depends
on our ability to identify, attract, engage, and retain audiences
who will volunteer their time. As the numbers cited above make
clear, Zooniverse has an excellent track record in this regard.
And, at this point in our project we are happy to report that we
have been broadly successful in engaging and attracting citizen
scientists to collaborate with us on this project. As of early April
2019, roughly 2900 unique users have completed nearly 140,000
coding tasks for Project SCOTUS Notes.79 Beyond this, we have
also, through the Talk Boards, actively engaged with our citizen
scientists who are helping us understand Supreme Court
conference. In the ten months since we launched Project
SCOTUS Notes, there have been almost 1400 postings on our
project’s boards. These posts provide a key opportunity for us to
answer questions and learn from the dedicated individuals
whose efforts make this project possible.
Considering only sheer numbers, transcription represents
the most challenging aspect of this project. However, we believe
it is ultimately the dissemination of these data that is the most
important component to ensuring that our data have the biggest
and broadest impact possible. As we suggest above, a variety of
audiences will be excited to “peek behind the curtain” and see
what takes place during these secret conference meetings. Our
overarching goal, then, is to provide the data in formats
appropriate for such diverse audiences. In that sense, our
approach is heavily influenced by the Supreme Court Database’s
website,80 which is designed in a way that allows novices,
experts, and everyone in between to use it.
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81. For example, a researcher could look at all conference notes in privacy cases (by
using “issueArea = 5” when searching in the Database) or, if searching more specifically,
will be able to restrict their searches to privacy cases involving abortion rights (by using
“issue = 50020” when searching in the Database). See Supreme Court Database, supra
note 41.
82. See, e.g., Kevin M. Quinn, Burt L. Monroe, Michael Colaresi, Michael H. Crespin,
& Dragomir R. Radev, How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal Assumptions and
Costs, 54 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 209 (2010) (providing a useful overview).
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Once completed, SCOTUS Notes will allow users to see
(and download) the basic digital reproduction of the conference
notes as well as the Zooniverse-generated transcriptions of them.
It will also be fully searchable, both in terms of accessing a
specific case (Roe v. Wade, for example) or by the content of
what a Justice said during conference (“privacy” or “viable,” for
example). Because our data will be linked with the Supreme
Court Database, users will also be able to further restrict their
browsing or searching to any variable in it.81 Pages for each case
will be linked with any other available data about the case,
including summaries, briefs, transcripts and audio of oral
argument, and, of course, the Court’s final opinion.
We suspect the majority of users of our data will interact
with them through this format. Researchers and scholars,
however, are more likely to want to obtain large quantities of
data that they can subsequently analyze on their own. To that
end, we will also provide machine-readable text files that
contain all transcribed content across the entire collection—or
any user-defined subset of it. We envision users invoking a
variety of programming languages (such as R or Python) and
computer programs (such as LIWC) to parse and analyze the
files using any one of a number of methods from computational
linguistics.82 These will be made available for bulk download
from the SCOTUS Notes Archive. We will also generate and
provide analysis-ready files that contain quantitative data about
the conference data for each case (how many lines of notes were
present, for example). Users will be able to easily merge these
files with other data for their specific research needs.
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83. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 261, 266
(2006).
84. MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 25, at 8 (coining the term in
noting that “[b]ecause outcomes on the Supreme Court depend on forging a majority
coalition that for most cases must consist of at least five justices, there is good reason to
expect that final Court opinions will be the product of a collaborative process, what we call
the collegial game”).
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As to what future research needs might be, we believe our
data on Supreme Court conference will enable scholars to make
theoretical, empirical, and substantive advances in how we
understand the Supreme Court, judicial decisionmaking, and the
development of law. The single most valuable aspect of these
data is their ability to provide detailed information on a Justice’s
preliminary legal and policy positions in a case. As we noted
above, the only existing systematic data provide information
about how each Justice voted in terms of case disposition
(reverse or aƥrm) but say nothing about why a Justice voted in
a particular way. This distinction is important because, for the
Supreme Court, “law is found primarily in legal opinions, not
divined from the outcomes of cases,” which means that it is “the
opinions that matter most.”83
Access to the Supreme Court’s ﬁnal written opinions is not,
of course, anything new. However, since the behavioral
revolution in political science, and the shift away from
formalism/traditionalism approaches, scholars have been
reluctant to take such documents at face value. The Court’s ﬁnal
written opinions do not spring fully formed from the head of
Zeus. Rather, they start with the views expressed by Justices
during conference and evolve based on their interactions with
one another during the opinion-writing process now referred to
by political scientists as the “collegial game.”84
We believe the metaphor is particularly apt. The game truly
begins when the Justices, much like poker players, sit around a
table and sequentially reveal their hands (their views and
preferences) to their colleagues. To date, however, this part of
the process has been noticeably neglected by scholars who study
opinion writing and bargaining. Instead, existing accounts focus
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85. See Knight & Epstein, supra note 5.
86. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 38.
87. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 65 AM. POLITICAL
SCI. REV. 43 (Mar. 1968).
88. See generally, e.g., MALTZMAN & WAHLBECK, supra note 12; Eve M. Ringsmuth,
Amanda C. Bryan, & Timothy R. Johnson, Voting Fluidity and Oral Argument on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 66 POLITICAL RES. Q. 429 (2013).
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on the role of political (ideology, for example) or contextual
(case importance, for example) factors and ignore the role of law
and legal discussion. Collecting and systematizing what happens
during conference, then, represents a major leap forward in
ﬂeshing out how judicial opinions are crafted and what drives
the often consequential policies they contain. Making these data
widely available will therefore transform our understanding of
the Supreme Court as both a political and legal institution.
Beyond breaking new ground, conference data will also
allow for fresh and improved insight about a number of broad
questions. Indeed, the two existing studies to use conference
data demonstrate that this is possible. Professors Knight and
Epstein were among the ﬁrst to contribute to a now ample (and
growing) literature about how law constrains Supreme Court
decisionmaking.85 Professor Johnson’s study was the ﬁrst to
establish that oral argument is not merely a dog-and-pony show
but an important aspect of the Court’s decisionmaking process.86
Like the data behind these ground-breaking studies, we
anticipate that our SCOTUS Notes data will help scholars
generate new knowledge in several areas.
First, consider the factors that may lead Justices to change
votes during their decisionmaking process. Since Professor
Howard’s initial 1968 study,87 scholars have sought to
understand when and why Justices change their votes after
conference but before they publicly announce a decision.
However, each of these studies focuses exclusively on changes
in dispositional votes.88 Our data will allow scholars to evaluate
this topic in light of something one might call legal ﬂuidity or,
more explicitly, changes in Justices’ substantive arguments as
they work towards a ﬁnal opinion. In so doing, researchers will
be able to dramatically expand upon and potentially reevaluate
conventional wisdom that has existed for half a century.

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 53 Side B

05/06/2019 10:22:20

BLACKJOHNSONRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

256

5/1/2019 11:16 AM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

05/06/2019 10:22:20

89. MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 25, at 96 (explaining that “if
opinion authors know that their colleagues are unlikely to sign an opinion that does not
reflect their preferences, authors may try to write an opinion comporting with the
discussion of the case at conference and thus satisfy their brethren with the first draft”).
90. Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POLITICAL
ECON. 23 (1948).
91. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Tom S. Clark, The Supreme Court’s Many
Median Justices, 106 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 847 (2012).
92. Chris W. Bonneau, Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck,
Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court,
AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 890 (2007).
93. Lax & Cameron, supra note 34, at 278–79 (referring to agenda control as a factor
in the Chief Justice’s assignment of opinions and discussing theories of agenda control by
Justices to whom opinions are assigned).
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Opinion writing and, in particular, preemptive
accommodation is a second area in which our data will generate
new knowledge. Professors Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
deﬁne this concept as how majority opinion authors attempt to
shore up support from Justices in the conference majority by
incorporating their positions into initial opinion drafts.89 To test
their account, however, Professor Maltzman and his colleagues
rely upon a coarse surrogate: the amount of time between when
a majority opinion author receives an opinion assignment and
when she circulates the ﬁrst draft of it to the Court. Though the
proxy is certainly plausible, our data will enable a more direct
measure by comparing the conference statements of each Justice
in the initial majority with the ﬁrst circulated draft written by the
opinion author. This type of analysis will take the ﬁeld away
from its conventional focus on votes and bring it much closer to
understanding the role law actually plays in how the Justices
decide.
Data resulting from our project will also contribute to
important and on-going theoretical debates. Consider the
question of who “controls” the Court’s majority opinion. For
decades scholars followed Professor Black90 and conceptualized
decisionmaking on the Court as taking place in a unidimensional
space, where the preferences of the median Justice prevailed.
That account has, in recent years, come under increasing
empirical and theoretical scrutiny.91 Professors Bonneau and his
colleagues,92 and Professors Lax and Cameron,93 through
separate theoretical approaches, argue that majority opinion
authors exert “agenda control” on opinion content. More
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94. Carrubba et al., supra note 34.
95. Lax & Cameron, supra note 34, at 297.
96. E.g., Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Scott
Comparato, Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 54 AM. J.
POLITICAL SCI. 891 (2010).
97. E.g., Benjamin Kassow, Donald R. Songer & Michael P. Fix, The Influence of
Precedent on State Supreme Courts, 65 POLITICAL RES. Q. 372 (2012).
98. E.g., Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of
Powers, 95 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 361 (2001).
99. E.g., CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE
W. BUSH (2008).
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recently, Professor Carrubba and his colleagues94 suggest it is
the median Justice within the majority coalition whose
preferences reign supreme.
While the foundation of support for the median-voter
model has mostly eroded, uncertainty remains about which new
perspective is best suited to take its place. Lack of detailed data
is one of the main reasons scholars have not settled on a more
deﬁnitive answer to this important question because “[d]irect
empirical tests of the bargaining model require better or more
nuanced data on the policy content and craftsmanship of
opinions than are presently available.”95 To state the obvious,
the ﬁrst necessary step in identifying whose views are inﬂuential
is to measure those views. The data we propose to gather
through SCOTUS Notes will allow scholars to accomplish
exactly that. In fact, the conference notes will oơer evidence of
what each Justice spoke about during conference, which will
make it possible to determine whose views prevail in the ﬁnal
opinion.
To provide an answer to the question of opinion control is
to do much more than merely resolve a theoretical debate among
scholars. Rather, this question speaks to how researchers
substantively understand and think about the inner workings of
the Court. There are profound practical implications for scholars
as well. Studies from across the entire spectrum of American
politics routinely seek to put the Supreme Court in a policy
space where it can be compared to other actors. This includes
the federal courts of appeals and federal district courts,96 state
courts,97 and other political institutions, including Congress,98
the President,99 and the federal bureaucracy.100 Doing so
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requires knowing where the Court belongs, which is something
scholars will be able to better accomplish with the explicit
substantive legal and policy data we will gather at SCOTUS
Notes.
Finally, at the most basic substantive level, our project will
make broadly available information and data previously
accessible only to individuals with the resources to travel to an
archive. With the exception of the small number of cases
transcribed by Professor Dickson,101 information about the legal
positions of Justices in more than 6500 cases are ignored by
history and scholars alike. When these notes are made available,
researchers will be able to utilize them to provide careful, indepth analyses of speciﬁc cases, Justices, issue areas, and eras of
Court decisionmaking.
VIII. CONCLUSION
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100. E.g., Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis &
David C. Nixon, Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies,
Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 341 (2012).
101. DICKSON, supra note 6.
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Much of the work done by the United States Supreme
Court is shrouded in absolute secrecy. We propose to pull back
the curtain and make public nearly ﬁfty years of previously
unexamined discussions among Justices on our nation’s highest
court. By gathering, transcribing, and coding a half century of
Supreme Court conference notes, SCOTUS Notes will enhance
scholarly understanding of what takes place during what is
arguably the most important step of the Court’s decisionmaking
process. The conference vote determines the initial disposition
of the case which, in turn, determines who has the power to
assign the author of the majority opinion. Further, these
discussions set the initial agenda—the frame through which the
Justices craft their substantive legal and policy arguments in the
opinion. Despite the importance of conference, existing
scholarship generally ignores the substance of these
proceedings. The work we propose will rectify this major
shortfall, engage the public in unprecedented ways, and
fundamentally transform our understanding of how the nation’s
highest court decides.
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APPENDIX
Full Citations—Cases Appearing in Tables 1 and 2
Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546 (1963)
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
Bell v. Md., 378 U.S. 226 (1964)
Bos. Firefighters Union Local 718 v. NAACP, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984)
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961)
Cox v. La., 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)
Firefighters Local v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984)
Garner v. La., 368 U.S. 157 (1961)
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970)

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)
Ore. v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203 (1961)
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
Williams v. Ga., 349 U.S. 375 (1955)
Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
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Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
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